This article characterizes the optimal corporate fire insurance contract when the insured firm has private information about the economic value of the damaged assets. It is shown that the indemnity should be lower when the firm receives insurance money than in case of reinstatement, but there should be partial coverage even when reinstatement is chosen. When a risk of arson exists, the insurer may only reimburse reinstatement costs.
INTRODUCTION
Following the accidental destruction of productive assets (e.g., buildings, plant, inventories), a firm must decide whether to repair or replace those assets. The reinvestment decision rule of the firm's manager usually rests on a net present value calculation (NPV). Future cash flows are estimated under the replacement and abandonment strategies. After deducting the replacement cost in one case and adding the salvage value of the damaged assets in the other one, the manager will be in a position to calculate the NPV of both strategies. The optimal strategy will be the one with the highest NPV.
As an example, in the absence of an efficient market for second-hand goods, a firm may have chosen to retain underproductive assets because expected discounted cash flows from continued use exceed the disposal value. In such a case, should the assets be accidentally destroyed, reinvestment will not be appropriate and the activity should be abandoned if the replacement cost is too high. Such circumstances are likely to prevail in a period of declining demand. On the contrary, strong productive interdependencies would strengthen the case for the reinvestment, especially if a post-loss abandonment creates a bottleneck in the production process.
1 Reinvestment decisions are also affected by the tax law. In particular, when the capital-gains tax rate is lower than the corporate profit tax rate, then a post-loss reinvestment is more likely to increase the value of the firm. 2 Reinvestment decisions may also be affected by specific provisions of the firm's insurance contract. This is particularly obvious in corporate fire insurance. Indeed, when physical assets are destroyed by fire, the amount of the insurance coverage frequently depends on the reinstatement decision. In particular:
1. When the insured has the option to choose between insurance money or reinstatement, the indemnity is usually lower in the first case than in the second one. In case of reinstatement, the insurer pays for the replacement or repair of damaged capital, but a deductible applies when the insured chooses to receive insurance money. In fact, when there is no reinstatement, the insurance payment frequently corresponds to the accounting book value of the damaged assets, while there is full coverage (or at least a larger coverage) of the replacement cost in case of reinstatement. 2. Sometimes reinstatement is an option expressly given by the contract of insurance to the insurer rather than the insured. 4 For instance, Section 83 of the British Fire Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774 provides that "in order to deter and hinder illminded persons from wilfully setting their house or other buildings on fire in view of gaining to themselves the insurance money,..." fire insurers are "authorized and required" to expend the insurance money on the reinstatement of the house or building. However, this provision applies only to the extent that the insurer has "grounds of suspicion" that the insured has been guilty of fraud or wilfully setting the building on fire.
3. As emphasized by Clarke (1997) , "An initial offer of money by the insurer may be seen as a first move in negotiations and does not rule out a later election to reinstate, if the initial offer is refused." 5 In other words, the insurer usually has a right of election (to reinstate or not), but this is a threat that may not be carried out.
Hence, in game-theory terms, exercising the reinstatement option is a mixed strategy: sometimes the insurer elects to reinstate and sometimes it does not.
The purpose of this article is to appraise the economic rationale of such provisions through the building of a simple model of corporate fire insurance. The starting point is an economy in which firms may buy fire insurance: a capital good (plant, building, inventories, etc.) may be accidentally destroyed by fire. It is assumed that the rein-statement cost (i.e., the cost that has to be incurred to replace or repair the capital good) is publicly observable, but once the fire has occurred, the firm has private information about the economic value of the damaged goods. This economic value corresponds to the loss that will be incurred if there is no reinstatement-i.e., if the damaged equipment is not replaced. In such a case, the future expected cash flows derived from this equipment would be lost. The firm is supposed to have private information about these expected cash flows. It turns out that this informational asymmetry strongly affects the characterization of the optimal insurance contract. An insurance contract specifies an indemnity payment that may differ whether there is reinstatement (i.e., the insurer pays for the replacement of the capital good that is reinstated) or payment of insurance money.
Our results can be summarized as follows:
(i) We show that the indemnity should be larger in case of reinstatement than in case of insurance money, but that there should be partial coverage as well when reinstatement is chosen. This result holds even if no risk of arson exists. In fact, the structure of indemnity payments is chosen to minimize the rent the firms enjoy when the (unverifiable) economic losses are smaller than the insurance money payment, but also to prevent the firm from inefficient reinstatement (i.e., reinstatement when the economic value of the damaged capital is low). The first objective requires lowering the insurance money indemnity, which conflicts with the second one. Indeed, efficient reinstatement decisions are made when the insured receives a lump sum payment, i.e., a payment that does not depend on the reinstatement decision. It turns out that the trade-off always tips in favor of lowering the insurance money payment below the reinstatement indemnity. Nevertheless, when there is no risk of arson, the optimal amount of insurance money is always positive whatever the reinstatement costs. Furthermore, providing partial coverage of replacement costs mitigates the inefficient reinstatement behavior.
(ii) The possibility of arson is an additional motive for lowering insurance money under the reinstatement indemnity, but, as indicated above, the risk of arson is not a necessary condition for the optimality of differentiated indemnity levels. In our model, arson may be decided on by dishonest firms that are in a position to set unprofitable equipment on fire to obtain insurance money. The market equilibrium with fraud corresponds to a contract that maximizes the expected utility of honest firms, under the constraint that it should also break even when it is chosen by dishonest firms that may commit arson. It is shown that, because of the risk of arson, the insurer may be led not to offer any insurance money to the firm but only to reimburse reinstatement costs.
(iii) We also consider stochastic mechanisms in which reinstatement is an option given by the insurance contract to the insurer but not always carried out at equilibrium. In other words, the insurer now is in a position to condition its payment on reinstatement, but this option may not be exercised. This is modeled as a revelation game. Once a fire has occurred, the firm sends a message to the insurer that conveys information about its eco-nomic losses (i.e., about the economic value of damaged equipment). The insurance indemnity and the probability of exercising the reinstatement option depend on the firm's message. In a deterministic contract (i.e., in the contracts considered thus far), the firm is offered two indemnity levels depending on whether there is reinstatement. Equivalently, the firm can send only the messages "I reinstate" or "I do not reinstate." More generally, in a stochastic contract, the probability of exercising the reinstatement option may differ from zero and one: i.e., a larger set of possible messages is available. We consider so-called credible stochastic contracts in which the level of the indemnity payment does not depend on whether the insurer exerts its reinstatement option. It depends only on the firm's message and on the reinstatement cost. In a noncredible stochastic contract, the insurer would be incited to deviate from its pre-announced reinstatement strategy to decrease its expected payment. Our main result here is the fact that there always exist credible stochastic contracts that dominate the optimal deterministic contract. Intuitively, the (randomly exercised) reinstatement option is used as a screening device, with which to discriminate among firms. Larger indemnity payments require larger probabilities of reinstatement, which prevents firms with low economic losses from building up their claims.
The study is organized as follows. The second section describes the basic model without arson, and it characterizes the optimal deterministic contract with two level indemnity payments. The third section extends the model by considering the risk of arson and its consequences. The next section focuses on stochastic contracts in which the reinstatement option is given to the insurer but not necessarily carried out at equilibrium. The last section concludes the study. All proofs are gathered in an appendix.
THE MODEL
We consider a competitive market for corporate fire insurance. The economic value of the firms (i.e., their discounted cash flows) is denoted as W. Firms incur the risk of a fire with a probability of Q .
6 When a fire occurs, capital goods are destroyed, which leads to a (publicly observable) reinstatement cost x. This cost is randomly distributed over < > 0, K , with 0 K according to a cumulative probability distribution func-
for all x. No physical depreciation occurs and, in case of reinstatement, the damaged assets are identically replaced. The economic loss É 0, R R º corresponding to the damaged capital goods (e.g., corresponding discounted cash flows) will be recovered if there is reinstatement. 7 This economic loss corresponds to the private value of reinstatement for the firm, meaning that even if the insurer were able to appraise these discounted cash flows, no competent court exists in which this knowledge could lead to an enforceable judg-6 In the model, fire is the only source of uncertainty. The analysis could easily be extended to the case where W is a random variable. 7 In other words x R is the opportunity cost of the no-reinstatement strategy. In practice, the distinction between reinstatement and no-reinstatement may not be so clear cut, either because a depreciated asset is replaced by a new one or because technological progress leads the firm to choose a profit-maximizing replacement and not a replica of the damaged assets. ment. As is usual in the literature on incentives and contract, we will refer to this problem of unverifiable private value as a private information problem.
Although no physical depreciation occurs, the damaged assets may be underproductive, i.e., they may have a low value in continued use (for instance, when demand for products is declining), in which case their economic value is low. On the contrary, production interdependencies may lead the firm's manager to attribute a large economic value to the damaged assets. The variable R is correlated with x, and we denote É | F x R as the cumulative distribution of the economic loss conditional to the reinstatement cost, with É É
as the conditional density. The uncertainty of the economic value of damaged assets corresponds to the underlying fact that the firm owns many productive assets with uneven economic value/replacement cost ratios. Nevertheless, because of transaction costs, a unique insurance policy is written for the whole set of assets. 
The optimal insurance contract maximizes the firm's expected utility subject to the constraint that the insurer's expected profit is nonnegative. Hence, under symmetric information, the optimal contract maximizes
, and P subject to
The solution of this problem is given in the following proposition whose proof is straightforward.
Proposition 1:
Under symmetric information, the optimal contract satisfies:
The interpretation of the optimal contract is as follows. Full insurance is in place. Firms whose economic loss is small (i.e., less than the cost of the reinstatement) do not reinstate and they are compensated by an indemnity corresponding to their economic loss, whereas firms whose economic loss is high reinstate and the reinstatement cost is reimbursed by the insurer.
We now assume that the economic loss is private information. In case of fire, the insured has the option to choose between insurance money or reinstatement. Then an insurance contract is given by
, where P is the insurance premium, É R t x is the indemnity payment when the reinstatement cost is x and the firm elects to reinstate, and É N t x is the indemnity payment when the firm elects not to reinstate. By deciding to reinstate, a firm recovers the economic loss R at cost
. If the firm chooses the no-reinstatement option, then it obtains insurance money É N t x but R is lost. Consequently, firms whose economic loss is less than
will decide not to reinstate. 9 The insurer cannot prevent the firm from pocketing the insurance money and reinstating later on, which will be the
. Hence, we must assume É
for the no-reinstatement option to be effective when the firm receives the insurance money. Hence, the optimal contract maximizes 
, we have ˆ( ) x x R and, consequently, firms whose economic loss lies in
decide to reinstate inefficiently. Alleviating such an inefficient reinstatement behavior (to obtain ˆ( ) x x R ) would require the payment of a lumpsum transfer depending on the reinstatement cost x but not on the decision of the 9 This two-options problem looks like the one studied by Garratt and Marshall (1996) . They consider a property insurance market in which the owner has an option to convert or move out of a damaged property rather than restore it to its previous condition. The loss of wealth by the owner is upward bounded because the option to convert is exercised if the damage exceeds a threshold level. In the present study, the no-reinstatement strategy may be considered as an option to convert, which will be exercised if the economic value of damaged assets is lower than the threshold level É
. But in that case, the firm would benefit from over-insurance if ˆ( ) x R R , which does not correspond to an optimal risk sharing. Reducing this inefficiency requires decreasing the insurance money ( ) N t x . Hence, the optimal contract is the result of a trade-off between two inefficiencies: the ex ante risk sharing inefficiency and the ex post reinstatement inefficiency. It turns out that the trade-off always tips in favor of decreasing ( ) N t x under É R t x . Nevertheless, ( ) N t x always remains positive: the firm may elect to receive insurance money (whatever the reinstatement cost), but then the indemnity is lower than when reinstatement occurs.
in which there is inefficient reinstatement, but this decrease in the insurance payment entails a departure from perfect insurance when x R . Here also the trade-off tips in favor of decreasing the insurance indemnity, which gives ( )
. In other words, the optimal contract provides partial coverage of reinstatement costs. Finally, note that ˆ( ) 0 x R for the optimal contract. Hence, whatever the size of damages (measured by x), cases always exist in which insurance money is paid and no reinstatement occurs. As we will see in the third section, this is no more the case when a risk of arson exists.
Investigating the relationship between the insurance coverage and the age of the damaged equipment is of particular interest because the age of a capital good may be an informative signal of its profitability. Indeed, more often than not, for a given reinstatement cost, late capital vintages have a higher economic value than older ones. Of course, it is only in probability terms: an accidental fire may entail large economic losses even if the damaged investment had been made a long time ago. Furthermore, the date at which equipment was installed can usually be verified. Hence, it is not astonishing that, quite often, insurance contracts specify coverage rules that depend on the age of damaged capital goods. This is particularly the case when the insurance payment is equal to the accounting book value of the assets.
Assume that an increase in the age of equipment results in a first-order stochastic decrease in the levels of economic losses if this equipment is accidentally destroyed by fire. Likewise, an increase in the reinstatement cost shifts the probability distribution of the economic loss in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. Let n be the age of the damaged capital good; x and n are jointly distributed according to a cumulative distribution function ( , ) G x n . The conditional distribution of the economic loss is given by the cumulative distribution function ( , )
The variables x and n are supposed to be verifiable. An insurance contract is now defined by an indemnity schedule { ( , ), ( , )} N R t x n t x n , where the indemnity payment may depend on x and n. However, for the sake of simplicity, restrict attention to simple contracts in which the insurer provides full coverage in case of reinstatement. In other words, we here assume ( , ) R t x n x z . The question we want to investigate is the following: what is the effect of an increase in x or n on the insurance payment t N ? Intuition and observation suggest that the older the damaged equipment, the smaller the insurance money should be. Likewise, less insurance money should be paid when the reinstatement cost is smaller. The theoretical reason is simply that the age of the equipment and the reinstatement cost are respectively negatively and positively correlated with its economic value. This correlation justifies that a lower (respectively larger) amount of insurance money is paid if no reinstatement is decided on, according to the value of n (respectively x).
Proposition 3 shows that these intuitive results hold if the correlation between n and R , or x and R , takes the form of a monotonic likelihood ratio property.
Proposition 3: Assume that ( , ) ( , )
x f x n f x n R R is increasing in R and that ( , ) ( , ) n f x n f x n R R is decreasing in R . Then, when the insurer offers contracts with full coverage of reinstatement costs, i.e., ( , )
N t x n is increasing in x and decreasing in n.
Proposition 3 confirms that a larger amount of insurance money should be paid when the size of damages (in terms of reinstatement costs) is large. It also provides a rationale for a common feature of corporate fire insurance contracts: if the firm chooses not to reinstate, then the older the damaged equipment is, the larger the deductible on the insurance money payment will be.
ARSON
We now assume that firms may be honest or dishonest. Dishonest firms may commit arson to get insurance money. We also assume that the type of firm cannot be observed by the insurer.
10 For simplicity, in case of arson, the probability distribution of the reinstatement cost is exogenously given: x is randomly distributed according to the cumulative distribution function G*(x) with density g*(x). Dishonest firms more or less have the ability to set specific buildings on fire, with low economic losses. A more efficient arson technology shifts the distribution function of R leftward. To capture this heterogeneity among dishonest firms, we assume that, in a case of arson, the conditional cumulative distribution of R is * ( , ) A dishonest type -B firm commits arson if
, which means that (in expected utility terms) economic losses are less than insurance money gains. Because The market now includes an additional adverse selection feature because insurers cannot distinguish honest firms from dishonest ones. In this setting our definition of the market equilibrium is as follows (see Picard, 1996) : at the equilibrium, the insurers offer an insurance contract that maximizes the expected utility of honest firms under the profitability constraint when it is also taken out by dishonest firms.
Let I and 1 -I be respectively the proportion of dishonest and honest firms in the economy. The equilibrium contract maximizes:
with respect to ( ), ( ),
and B subject to: The assumption of ( ) f x R in Proposition 2 seems to be very weak. It means that, in case of accidental fire, reinstatement is usually worthwhile if x is very low, even if no insurance payment occurs. Intuitively, a small sized fire may entail non-negligible profit losses so that it is optimal to reinstate. According to Proposition 4, when a risk of arson exists, a stronger reinstatement option should be given to the insurer. Now for some level of losses (in terms of reinstatement cost) the insurer is entitled to deny any indemnity if no reinstatement occurs. The strength of Proposition 4 is that this result holds whatever the proportion of dishonest firms (as soon as this proportion is strictly positive). Intuitively an additional motive now exists for decreasing ( ) N t x under ( ) R t x besides the trade-off described above, namely reducing the arson incentives. This leads the insurer to cancel any insurance money payment, at least when x is small: it reimburses only reinstatement costs.
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STOCHASTIC CONTRACTS
The optimal contracts that have been characterized in the previous sections may be interpreted as revelation mechanisms: for a given reinstatement cost x they define an indemnity payment ( , ) t x R % and a reinstatement probability ( , ) x T R % as functions of a message R % sent by the insured firm to the insurer. The R % symbol denotes a loss report that may differ from the actual loss R . We have ( , ) ( )
, and ( , ) 1
. Hence, these mechanisms are deterministic, i.e.,
. Furthermore, the firm truthfully announces its loss (i.e., R R % is an optimal strategy of the firm), which is nothing but a straightforward illustration of the Revelation Principle.
We now consider stochastic contracts in which the reinstatement decision is random. In these cases, the insurer proposes to the insured firm that it will benefit from the reimbursement ( , ) 
R N t x t x R R % % and no reinstatement in the other case. This deviation is likely if the insured firms cannot observe the behavior of the insurer in similar cases in past periods. That is the reason we restrict the analysis to credible contracts defined as follows:
In a credible stochastic contract, the insurer has no incentive to deviate from its preannounced strategy. Assume (for simplicity) that no risk of arson exists; we have the following result:
Proposition 5: There exists a credible stochastic contract that dominates the optimal deterministic contract.
In the proof of Proposition 5, we exhibit a credible stochastic contract that dominates the optimal deterministic contract. This stochastic contract corresponds to the following revelation mechanism. For any reimbursement cost x, there exist two thresh- T such that the corresponding stochastic contract dominates the optimal deterministic contract.
Here the reinstatement option is used as a screening device to discriminate among firms more efficiently than with a deterministic contract. From an incentives theory standpoint, we have exhibited a case in which a stochastic mechanism dominates the optimal deterministic mechanism although the agents are risk averse. In this stochastic contract, the reinstatement option is actually a threat that is not always carried out at equilibrium. A simple interpretation of this contract in terms of a bargaining game is as follows. Given the reinstatement cost x the insurer makes an initial money offer ( ) N t x . This offer may be refused by the insured firm, in which case the latter announces to the insurer that his economic loss is R % with
The firm will then receive a larger indemnity:
The reinstatement option will be exercised by the insurer with probability in the first case and with certainty in the second one.
CONCLUSION
This article has analyzed the logic of some common features of corporate fire insurance contracts in the framework of a model in which the insured firm has private information on the economic value of the damaged productive assets. Indeed, insurers are frequently less reluctant to repay a bill than to reimburse damaged capital goods in cash. In some instances, insurers even require the firm to reinstate before paying any insurance indemnity. Reinstatement may also be a threat that is not systematically carried out but that allows insurers to mitigate the cost of informational rents.
We have shown that even when no risk of arson exists, the reinstatement indemnity should be larger than the insurance money, but that a deductible should also be applied when reinstatement is chosen. This payment structure allows the insurer to minimize the rent enjoyed by the firms when the economic losses are smaller than the insurance payment and also to mitigate inefficient reinstatement. Furthermore, the possibility of arson may induce the insurer not to offer any insurance money to the firm but only to reimburse reinstatement costs, whereas the optimal amount of insurance money is always positive whatever the reinstatement costs when no risk of arson exists. In an enlarged set of insurance contracts in which reinstatement is an option the insurance contract gives to the insurer, credible stochastic contracts always exist that dominate the optimal deterministic contract. This result was obtained with simple stochastic contracts, but our mechanism design approach could be extended to more general contracts, where the insurer's reinstatement option and the indemnity payment evolve continuously with the firm's report about its economic loss. Such an extension would be necessary to characterize the optimal stochastic contract and to get a better understanding of the effect of insurance contracts on firms' investment strategies.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 2
We delete the condition ( ) ( )
and check that it actually holds at the optimal solution of the relaxed problem.
Let 0
M s be a Kuhn-Tucker multiplier associated with Constraint (1). First-order optimality conditions are:
Adding equations (A1) and (A2) gives:
for all x.
Equations (A3) and (A4) then give:
K . Then Equation (A1) gives: 
and Equation (A2) implies:
Note that ˆ( ) x x R s . Consequently, equations (A6) and (A7) imply: . Using Equation (A2) gives:
. I
Proof of Proposition 3
There is reinstatement when
x n x t x n t x n t x n R Condition (A1) is replaced by:
Differentiating Equation (A8) gives: 
where ( , ) N N t t x n z . Using equations (A8) and (A9) gives:
Likewise, equations (A8) and (A10) give:
, ,
is increasing in R and negative over [0, )
.
Equations ( 
Equations (A8) and (A14) then give N n > 0, which implies 0
Proof of Proposition 4
Once again, we delete the condition ( ) ( )
M and N be Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated with equations (2) and (3). First-order optimality conditions are:
Observe that equations ( for some x,
Furthermore, Equation (A16) implies:
, and thus(
Using equations (A19) and (A20) yields: 
Multiplying both sides of Equation (A21) by g(x) and integrating over < > 0, K gives: We deduce that (0 ) 
Proof of Proposition 5
Let \( ), ( ) N R t x t x be the optimal deterministic contract. We consider a stochastic contract defined as follows. For all x in < > 0, K , the insured firm may choose either not to reinstate and to receive ( ) N t x , to reinstate with probability ( ) x T and to receive ( ) t x , or to reinstate with certainty and to receive ( ) R t x . We assume ( ) ( ) ( )
N R t x t x t x
. As depicted in Figure 1 , the expected utility curve corresponding to the decision not to reinstate [i.e., . Straightforward calcula-,
